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PRIVATE LAW
any law to protect persons suffering personal injuries from the
possibility of error inherent to quick releases, compromises, or
settlements, and this court would not be justified in declaring
a 'rush release' invalid simply because it was obtained within a
very short time of the accident. In such cases, however, we
feel that we are justified in recognizing that high potential for
error in our consideration of all the facts and circumstances
connected with the execution of this type of release."'8
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
PLEDGE
In Montaldo Ins. Co. v. Cullotta,' a judgment creditor brought
a garnishment proceeding against a bank in which the judgment
debtor had some money on deposit. However, to secure a loan,
the depositor had executed a written pledge of his accounts to
the bank. This was held to be a good pledge for which delivery
was not necessary since the pledgee bank already had posses-
sion2 and there was no waiver of its rights by permitting ac-
tivity of the checking account and withdrawals from the savings
account. Thus, even though the plaintiff's garnishment was
maintained, his rights were subject and subordinate to the
bank's pledge which more than covered the funds in the ac-
counts.
PRIVILEGES
The facts in the case of Pecora v. Jamess were pregnant with
several problems which remained stillborn. James purchased a
trailer under a conditional sale contract executed and duly re-
corded in Mississippi. With a large balance still unpaid, he
brought the trailer to Louisiana and parked it on the plaintiff's
premises under a monthly rental agreement. When he disap-
peared leaving the rent unpaid, the plaintiff had the trailer
seized under a writ of sequestration claiming a lessor's privilege.
8. Id. at 174, 151 So. 2d at 362.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 153 So. 2d 899 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
2. LA. CivIL CODE art. 3152 (1870).
3. 150 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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Whereupon an intervention and third opposition were filed by
the assignee of the Mississippi conditional sale contract. The
court treated the conditional sale as if it were a chattel mort-
gage, and since there was evidence that the trailer had been
removed from Mississippi without the knowledge or consent 4
of the conditional vendor, this creditor's lien was given priority
because it attached prior in time to the lessor's privilege.
The numerous possibilities of choice-of-law treatment of
this conflicts problem are swallowed up and remain unmen-
tioned in the still-used old formula, quoted from a prior case,
that under appropriate circumstances Louisiana recognizes a
foreign conditional sale "through comity."
A conditional sale is not a chattel mortgage, and since the
Louisiana law of privileges is stricti juris,5 the assimilation by
this analogy is not warranted. If the creditor actually had a
chattel mortgage, there might be some basis for applying the
chronological ranking provision of the Louisiana Chattel Mort-
gage Law6 because it is later legislation than the Civil Code.
If the Mississippi conditional sale were treated as a Louisiana
sale so as to give the unpaid creditor a vendor's privilege, this
would be primed by the lessor's privilege under Civil Code
article 3263. Taking the common law effect of the conditional
sale as reservation of title, the trailer did not belong to James,
so that the lessor's privilege could not be claimed under article
2705 on the effects of the lessee but only under article 2707 on
the effects of third persons. However, there would be no lessor's
privilege under this latter article because the trailer was not
there with any express or implied consent of the creditor who
had title, and furthermore there is doubt as to whether this
article would cover a trailer placed on open ground because
the article says "contained in the house or store."'7
Under the Civil Code system of privileges, priority is fixed
by their natures and they even come ahead of Civil Code mort-
gages.9 It is only because the Chattel Mortgage Law is later
legislation which supersedes the Code that a chronological rank-
ing is applied to chattel mortgages in competition with Code
4. G. M. Acceptance Corp. v. Nuss, 195 La. 209, 196 So. 323 (1940).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3185 (1870).
6. LA. R.S. 9:5354 (1950).
7. See Boone v. Brown, 201 La. 917, 10 So. 2d 701 (1942).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3187 (1870).
9. Id. art. 3186.
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privileges.'0 The court further disregards the stricti juris rule
of privileges by dismissing the plaintiff's alternative claim of a
privilege for expenses of preservation" because "such liens are
subordinate to the lien and privilege accorded to chattel mort-
gages." 12 While this is true where the chattel mortgage is
earlier in date, it is not correct if the chattel mortgage is later
in date. Thus, the blunt statement without qualification can be
seriously misleading -even if there is a chattel mortgage,
which was not so in the instant case. In the long run, more
important than the result reached is the court's method of
analysis and treatment of complicated problems. To begin with,
a conflict of laws case should be given more direct treatment
as such. Then, in applying the Louisiana choice-of-law rule
which recognizes a common law conditional sale in appropriate
circumstances, there should be a more careful and conscious
analysis and determination of what it is that is being recognized
in terms of Louisiana concepts and institutions together with
an interpretation of the policies inherent in both the local statute
and the foreign law. These comments do not purport to suggest
or provide the answers; they are meant to emphasize the prime
importance of getting at the proper questions.
BUILDING CONTRACT PRIVILEGES
R.S. 9:4816 provides for a single privilege on several build-
ings which are constructed on adjacent lots by the same con-
tractor. In Bernard Lumber Co. v. John F. Cerise Co.,13 the
court of appeal gave a liberal interpretation to the word "ad-
jacent" and held that the intent of the legislature was to cover
the case of a subdivision or multi-building project where some
of the houses are necessarily separated by streets and sometimes
substantial distances. On its inherent logic, this seem reasonable
enough. However, in view of the fact that privileges constitute
an area of the law which is stricti juris, and since the extension
of the privilege to more than one building was only a rather late
amendment as section 15-1/2 added by Act 79 of 1944, it is
questionable whether the above interpretation is appropriate
and whether any weight should be given to the citation of Corpus
10. Dainow, Ranking Problems of Chattel Mortgages and Civil Code Privileges,
13 LA. L. REV. 537 (1953).
11. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3217(6), 3224-3226 (1870).
12. 150 So. 2d at 94.
13. 148 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), writ refused . .. no error of
law, 150 So. 2d 767 (La. 1963).
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Juris for definitions of the word "adjacent" as used in a Louisi-
ana statute creating a stricti juris privilege.
In Lumber Products, Inc. v. Crochet,14 the court of appeal
interpreted R.S. 9:48121- in relation to a difficult problem. A
supplier duly recorded his claim and acquired a materialman's
privilege, and a day before the expiration of one year he made
a reinscription of it. Shortly thereafter, suit was instituted
against the owner, and judgment was rendered in the trial court
recognizing the privilege against the property. This part of the
judgment was affirmed on appeal (with one dissent) because
the plaintiff had kept his privilege alive by timely reinscription.
As reasonable as it might sound, this decision was reversed
by the Supreme Court with a very able and a carefully analyzed
opinion in Lumber Products, Inc. v. Crochet.', The fact situa-
tion in which the building contract and the bond are not recorded
is governed by R.S. 9:4812, which gives the creditor the pro-
tection of two unusual rights. One is a privilege against the
property; the other is a personal right against the owner. Both
are in derogation of the general law and must be strictly con-
strued. In the present case, the exclusive issue centered on the
in rem privilege against the property, and therefore the question
before the court had to be determined on the basis of the statu-
tory provision cited above.'7
Since there had been a timely reinscription, it was urged
(and sustained by the court of appeal) that keeping the privilege
alive was synonymous with the preservation of its benefits. The
Supreme Court's interpretation of the statutory provision shows
it to be more complicated, and that in addition to the basic
element of the existing indebtedness (presumably subject to the
ten-year prescription) there are two distinct elements in the
statute: (a) the privilege and (b) the right to enforce it. In the
strict interpretation of the statute, each of these two elements
must be preserved, as prescribed, in order for the creditor to
14. 146 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
15. ". . . The said privilege, recorded as aforesaid, shall constitute a privilege
against the property for a period of one year from the date of its filing, and may
be enforced by a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction in the parish
in which the land is situated and such right of action shall prescribe within one
year from the date of the recordation of the privilege in the office of the recorder
of mortgages. The effect of the registry ceases, even against the owner of the
property or the property itself, if the inscription has not been renewed within one
year from the date of the recordation .... "
16. 156 So. 2d 438 (La. 1963).
17. See note 15 supra.
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reap the benefits of the special protection afforded him. The
effect of registry is to create the privilege, and it is kept alive
by timely reinscription within one year. The right to enforce
it must be exercised within one year, and there is no possibility
of extending this by reinscription. Thus, to be successful on this
score, the creditor must commence his action for enforcement
within one year and he must also make a timely reinscription
in the event that a final judgment is not rendered within one
year from the date of the recordation. The institution of suit
does not take the place of reinscription to keep the privilege
alive.
In addition to this appropriate stricti juris interpretation of
the statutory text per se, emphasizing these two distinct ele-
ments of this statute, Justice Summers' opinion 18 goes on to
substantiate it further by (a) the legislative history of the
original provision and its amendments, 19 (b) the public policy
of preventing the creation of a perpetual encumbrance and
cloud on property by the unilateral inscription and reinscription
of the supplier's claim,20 and (c) the public records doctrine of
protecting third persons who may rely on the records which
showed no reinscription while a suit of enforcement might be
pending. There is much strength in his conclusion that "if there
are onerous implications to be drawn from the ambiguous lan-
guage of this act, they must be resolved against the parties in
whose favor the privilege is granted."'21
Another part of the same section of this statute was the
basis of decision in Kaplan v. Pettigrew.22 Here, the issue cen-
tered on the right in personam against the owner. Claims were
duly recorded for labor and materials, and just prior to the
expiry of one year the recordation was reinscribed. A second
reinscription was made a few days less than one year after the
first reinscription. On the basis of a strict construction of the
word "reinscription" in the singular, the court held that the
statute permitted only one reinscription and after its effective
duration of one year the personal claim against the owner was
prescribed. From the policy viewpoint, it is not unreasonable
to prevent the indefinite clouding of a property title by con-
18. Justices Hamiter and Hawthorne dissenting.
19. 156 So. 2d at 44243.
20. Id. at 443.
21. Ibid.
22. 150 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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tinuous unilateral reinscriptions without adjudication or settle-
ment of a claim. The ordinary prescriptions under the Civil
Code are subject to interruption by acknowledgment, but by
reason of the strict interpretation of this statute the prescrip-
tion provided would be a peremptory one like a period of for-
feiture.
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Occasionally, the juxtaposition of circumstances produces
curious results. If a squatter occupies a piece of property with-
out any color of right but physically fences it in and keeps
everybody out, he is possessing "as owner," and after thirty
years he acquires the legal ownership by acquisitive prescrip-
tion. On the other hand, when a municipality revokes the dedi-
cation of certain streets which then revert to the ownership of
private individuals, who are unaware of the revocation, such
persons do not possess "as owners" and cannot prescribe. This
latter situation happened in the case of Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp.
v. Weber.' Since the revocation ordinance had not been re-
corded, the transactions based on the existing records were
protected. The public records doctrine prevails against an un-
recorded assertion of ownership, but it yields to a proper claim
of acquisitive prescription. An unrecorded basis of ownership
being precluded, the attempt was made to plead good faith pre-
scription, but lack of knowledge of the unrecorded revocation
ordinance prevented possession "as owner. ' 2 Presumably, the
ordinance could not be a "just title" either, since the person did
not know about it and could not claim it as the basis of a belief
of ownership. There is unavoidably something disturbing about
the conclusion that a person to whom ownership of property
has reverted is denied the benefits of this ownership because
the municipality failed to notify him or to record its revocation
ordinance, without belaboring the fact that the municipality
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 149 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writ refused, judgment correct,
244 La. 205, 151 So. 2d 493 (1963).
2. LA. CiviL CODE art. 3478 et seq. (1870).
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